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In 1 948, Claude Shannon introduced his version of a concept that was core to Norbert Wiener's 
cybernetics, namely, information theory. Shannon's formalisms include a physical framework, 
namely a general communication system having six unique elements. Under this framework, 
Shannon information theory offers two particularly useful statistics, channel capacity and 
information transmitted. Remarkably, hundreds of neuroscience laboratories subsequently reported 
such numbers. But how (and why) did neuroscientists adapt a communications-engineering 
framework? Surprisingly, the literature offers no clear answers. To therefore first answer "how", 1 1 5  
authorit�ive peer-reviewed papers, proceedings, books and book chapters were scrutinized for 
neuroscientists' characterizations of the elements of Shannon's general communication system. 
Evidently, many neuroscientists attempted no identification of the system's elements. Others 
identified only a few of Shannon's system's elements. Indeed, the available neuroscience 
interpretations show a stunning incoherence, both within and across studies. The interpretational 
gamut implies hundreds, perhaps thousands, of different possible neuronal versions of Shannon's 
general communication system. The obvious lack of a definitive, credible interpretation makes 
neuroscience calculations of channel capacity and information transmitted meaningless. To now 
answer why Shannon's system was ever adapted for neuroscience, three common features of the 
neuroscience literature were examined: ignorance of the role of the observer, the presumption of 
"decoding" of neuronal voltage-spike trains, and the pursuit of ingrained analogies such as 
information, computation, and machine. Each of these factors facilitated a plethora of interpretations 
of Shannon's system elements. Finally, let us not ignore the impact of these "informational 
misadventures" on society at large. It is the same impact as scientific fraud. 
Keywords: Shannon, information theory, neuroscience, communication, observer, decoding, 
metaphor, machine 
1. Introduction 
In 1 948 Norbert Wiener wrote the foundational book Cybernetics ( 1948/ 196 1 ). He 
considered information to be crucial to cybernetics. That same year, Claude Elwood 
Shannon formalized information theory (Shannon, 1 948). The following year, 
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Shannon expounded upon it in a book that was co-authored and introduced by Warren 
Weaver (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Shannon's information theory quantified two 
desired performance measures, channel capacity and information transmitted. The 
latter was eventually re-labelled as mutual information (e.g., Cover & Thomas, 1991 ). 
Information theory became the focus of tens of thousands of communications­
engineering publications. 
Information theory is a mathematical model. The frame of any mathematical 
model is its assumptions. In particular, Shannon's information theory was predicated 
upon a general communication system (Shannon, 1 948; Shannon & Weaver, 1 949), an 
assumed physical framework having six elements, namely: 1 .  "An information source 
which produces a message or sequence of messages to be communicated to the 
receiving terminal" (Shannon, 1948, p. 380), (2) "A transmitter which operates on the 
message in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel" 
(p. 381), (3) a channel, where "The channel is merely the medium used to transmit the 
signal from transmitter to receiver" (p. 381), (4) a receiver, where "The receiver 
ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing 
the message from the signal" (p. 381), and (5) a destination, such that "The destination 
is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended" (p. 381). There was also (6) 
a noise source. Figure 1 illustrates the general communication system. 
Shannon ( 1948) stipulated that messages sent through his general communication 
system are groups of symbols, such as letters arranged into words and then into 
sentences. The information transmitted in a message, 11, can subsequently be 
calculated, because symbols have probabilities. Consider n possible events (symbols 
sent); the one that occurs is the outcome, which is uncertain if n > 1 unless the system 
is perfect. When each event has a known probability of occurrence, Pi, where i = 1, 
. .. , n, such that L�=I P; = 1, then the overall signal uncertainty (signal information) ls 
(using S for symbol sent or signal) is 
n 
i = I 
The value of K is a matter of convention; Shannon set K= 1. Denoting symbols by k, 
ls = -_Lp(k) logp(k) 
k 
The algebra is kept simple by stipulating that any symbol received is from the set of 
symbols that can be sent. But the system is noisy; not all symbols will be received as 
sent. Information transmitted, 11, can be calculated knowing (a) what symbols k 
(events) were sent, (b) what symbols} (outcomes) were received, and (c) the number 
of times a symbol sent as k was received as j, denoted �k . The latter numbers form an 
array called the confusion matrix. Figure 2 shows the confusion matrix for a total 
number N of symbols sent. Denoting the probability· that k was sent to be 
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p(k) = N_ k / N, and denoting the probability that k was sent if j was received to be 
P /k) = N Jk /NJ., we can now express the signal equivocation/entropy, Es, as 
Es =-II PJ (k) logp1 (k ) 
j k 
and the information transmitted, ft, as 
k j k 
Note well that these are averages, taken over the course of the entire message. The 
base of the logarithms is a positive integer. Traditionally, the base is set to 2. 
Information transmitted is thus in binary information units per symbol, bits/symbol. 
Note also that Is � J1 �Es � O, and that "noiseless" transmission would mean 
11 =IS. 
Information 
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Figure I .  Shannon's general communication system. Data, in the form of messages relayed using 
symbols, flows from source to destination. T he data itself may or may not have meaning to any persons 
involved. 
Shannon's model, summarized above, was concerned with man-made systems. 
Why, then, apply Shannon's information theory to neurons? The rationale proceeds as 
follows. When a sensory stimulus is applied to an organism that has neurons 
connected to sensory receptors, firing of voltage spikes may be evoked in those 
neurons. That is, the number of voltage spikes evoked during the spike-counting time, 
some sub-interval of the stimulus's duration, will change systematically as some 
stimulus characteristic is changed. But so may the instantaneous spike-firing rate, or 
the latency of the first stimulus-evoked spike, or the intervals between spikes, or "the 
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principal components of the temporal waveform of the response" (Nizami, 2014b, 
p. 2), and so forth. Nonetheless, the most commonly-used measure of the stimulus­
evoked neuronal response is the mean stimulus-evoked count of voltage spikes, 
estimated over repeated identical presentations of the stimulus. The mean spike-count 
tends to smoothly, systematically change in response to smooth, systematic sti.mulus 
change(s). Of course, what determines subjective experience may be the pattern of 
neurons that are engaged, rather than the transmission along any particular neuron. 
Nonetheless, the literature has emphasized the activity of single neurons, presumably 
because this has been easier to do, but also because of a belief that the whole cannot be 
understood without understanding the parts. 
There is some inherent variability (stochasticity) in any sensory neuron's response 
to changes in some stimulus characteristic(s); that is, the neuron's response to the 
sensory stimulus seems inherently confused. That confusion is what neuroscientists 
believe that they can quantify using information theory. To neuroscientists, the 
stimulus characteristic being varied (e.g., its intensity) is the Shannon symbol sent 
(event). Hopefully, the stimulus will evoke in the neuron, on average, a predictable 
symbol received (outcome). The difference between any event and the resulting 
outcome is attributed by neuroscientists to the probabilistic nature of spike firing, 
often interpreted as noise. 
Symbol sent (event) 
1 2 k 
Row 
n totals 
Symbol 
received 
(outcome) 
1 N 11 N 12 - N Ik - N In N i. 
2 N 21 N 22 - N 2k - N 20 N 2. 
N ii N i2 Nik Nin N. J· 
n N 01 N 02 - N nk - N nn N n. 
Column 
N .2 N.k N.n 
Sum 
N.1 - - =N totals 
Figure 2. Shannon's Information Theory Confusion Matrix. 
Any present conclusions about the appropriateness of information theory in 
neuroscience do not intrinsically depend upon the particulars of the neuronal response 
measure, but rather on how it is employed in calculating information transmitted, It. 
The present conclusions also apply under a particular technique that is slowly being 
adopted in the laboratory, namely, calculation of J 1 from a vector of responses, 
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representing an ensemble of neighboring neurons. What matters is that neurons are 
involved, not their particular number. 
The random processes underlying voltage-spike-generation are usually assumed 
to be unchanging with time (stationary), as presumably reflected in unchanging 
probability-density functions of either the voltage-spike counts or the time intervals 
between the spikes, or some other proxy. 
2. Problem and Method 
Joseph C. R. Licklider, a progenitor of the Internet, noted in 1951 that "It is probably 
dangerous to use this theory of information in fields for which it was not designed, but 
I think the danger will not keep people from using it" (quoted in Kline, 2015, p. 58). 
Likewise, in 1953 the engineer Robert Pano, who contributed to information theory, 
stated that 
I believe, for instance, that expressions for the amount ofinformation such as those which appear in 
Shannon's paper can only be used in problems where the transmitter and receiver are well­
identifiable, and where one can assume the existence of an ensemble of messages with known 
statistical characteristics. (Quoted in Kline, 20 1 5, p. 1 33) 
Nonetheless, hundreds of neuroscientists have published calculations of Shannon's 
information transmitted. Indeed, the use of information theory in various guises is 
broadening throughout biology (as indicated in the editorials by Milenkovic et al. , 
2010; Dimitrov, Fekri, Lazar, Moser, & Thomas, 2016). Consider, for example, a 
series of papers by Giulio Tononi and co-authors (e.g., Tononi, 2008; Tononi, Boly, 
Massimini, & Koch, 2016), who use an information theory framework to produce 
what the authors call an integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. The IIT 
model itself actually "claims that, at the fundamental level, consciousness is integrated 
information, and that its quality is given by the informational relationships generated 
by a complex of elements" (Tononi, 2008, p. 217). IIT has become a topic of popular 
interest (Reardon, 2019), with the help of some eager publicizing (Zimmer, 201 O; Koch 
& Tononi, 2008, 2017; Koch, 2018). This is hardly the only example of heavy 
inference being made subsequent to information theory analyses, leading to popular 
attention. For example, Rolls and co-authors (Tovee, Rolls, Treves, & Bellis, 1993; 
Tovee & Rolls, 1995; Rolls, Critchley, & Treves, 1996; Rolls, Critchley, Verhagen, & 
Kadohisa, 20 I 0) have used calculations of information transmitted to support the 
concept of sparse coding by neurons (Rolls & Treves, 2011 ), which has become quite 
trendy (Quian Quiroga, Fried, & Koch, 2013). 
The present paper scrutinizes neuroscientists' interpretations of the crucial 
framework that underlies information theory, namely, the six physical elements that 
comprise Shannon's general communication system (Shannon, 1948; Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949). The neuroscientists' interpretations altogether constitute the evidential 
basis for the present paper. Table 1 (Appendix) presents the aforementioned 
interpretations. Quotations are sometimes used in the table, in order to illustrate the 
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use of information theory terms in the various author's own words, while minimizing 
any accusations of inaccuracy or misinterpretation. The cited documents are listed 
from earliest to most recent, broadly spanning the literature on sensory neuroscience. 
These documents altogether represent 50 peer-reviewed journals, books, and 
proceedings, 259 scientists, and more than 113 research institutions (not including 
cross-appointments). Only English-language literature was surveyed, but this seems to 
represent the majority of the field. 
The total number of neuroscientists who have employed information theory 
analyses in their publications is unknown. But it is not difficult to find neuroscience 
laboratories that have produced 20 papers or more that employ information theory 
analyses, and it is likewise not difficult to find individuals who have co-authored 50 or 
more such papers. Evidently, it was profitable to do so. Some of those laboratories and 
some of those individuals are represented in Table 1. One individual, however, is 
notably absent, namely Kenneth Howard Norwich. Professor Norwich (MD, PhD) 
emphasized the application of information theory not only to sensory neuroscience but 
also to sensory psychology, producing so many published documents that the work 
deserved separate treatment (see Nizami, 2011 b ). In contrast to all this, some 
experiment-oriented laboratories produced just one or two published documents that 
used information theory. Some of those laboratories, too, are represented in the table. 
Possible reasons for the briefuess of their interest are addressed in sections 5-7 
(Discussion). 
3. Results 
Consider first how many of Shannon's six system elements were identified in the 
neuroscience documents cited here. Warren Weaver set the tone for the neuroscience 
use of Shannon system elements (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Weaver alone identified 
all six Shannon elements. And to Weaver, each Shannon element could be any aspect 
of a neuron, or of the world around it; no coherent identification emerged. Hagins 
( 1965) and much later McDonnell, Ikeda, and Manton (2011) identified five of the six 
Shannon elements, although Hagins did not identify the transmitter, and McDonnell, 
Ikeda, and Manton named the neuron itself as being three of the six elements. 
Elsewhere, four papers were found naming just four of the six elements (Table 1 ). 
Some documents identified none of the six elements (Rapoport & Horvath, 1960; 
Laughlin, 1981; Tolhurst, 1989; A tick & Redlich, 1990; Mcclurkin, Optican, 
Richmond, & Gawne, 1991; Tovee et al., 1993; Gochin, Colombo, Dorfman, Gerstein, 
& Gross, 1994; Nakao, Kawazoe, & Shimada, 1994; Tovee & Rolls, 1995; Gnadt & 
Breznen, 1996; Rolls et al., 1996; Buracas, Zador, Deweese, & Albright, 1998; Sugase, · 
Yamane, Ueno, & Kawano, 1999; Gehr, Komiya, & Eggermont, 2000; Reinagel & 
Reid, 2000; Borst & Haag, 2001; Nirenberg, Carcieri, Jacobs, & Latham, 2001; 
Arabzadeh, Panzeri, & Diamond, 2004; Kayser & Konig, 2004; Matsumoto, Okada, 
Sugase-Miyamoto, Yamane, & Kawano, 2005; DiCaprio, Billimoria, & Ludwar, 2007; 
Kumbhani, Nolt, & Palmer, 2007; Gastpar, Gill, Huth, & Theunissen, 2010; Rolls et 
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al., 2010; Suksompong & Berger, 2010; Farfan, Albarracin, & Felice, 2011; Gillespie 
& Houghton, 2011; Adibi, McDonald, Clifford, & Arabzadeh, 2013; Harvey, Saal, 
Dammann, & Bensmaia, 2013; Sugase-Miyamoto, Matsumoto, Ohyama, & Kawano, 
2014; Witham & Baker, 2015). This trend, of not identifying Shannon's system 
elements, became commonplace in the 1980s, and became altogether the rule after 
Rieke and colleagues published an integral-calculus method in the late 1990s (Rieke, 
Warland, de Ruyter van Steveninck, & Bialek, 1997; Warland, Reinagel, & Meister, 
1997; Strong, Koberle, de Ruyter van Steveninck, & Bialek, 1998), a method which 
was widely adopted in neuroscience (for example, Table l entries 46, 49, 54, 58, 61, 
65, 66, 70, 73, 79, 82, 83, 84; also Reinagel & Reid, 2000; Borst & Haag, 2001; 
Nirenberg et al., 2001; Kumbhani et al., 2007; Suksompong & Berger, 2010). 
Consider now the identities assigned to individual Shannon system elements. 
This, too, proves to be illuminating. Begin with destination. This element was ignored 
in all but four of the documents inspected here, where it is your brain (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949, p. 7) or "A detector located at the output of the receiver and operating 
as a decision-making device like some part of the retina or brain" (Hagins, 1965, 
p. 405) or "other brain centers" (Heller, Hertz, Kjaer, & Richmond, 1995, p. 176) or 
"The behavior of the organism that results from the motor signal [that is evoked 
eventually in response to a stimulus]" (Rathkopf, 2017, p. 322). Of course, the actual 
destination for the actual information theory calculations is never the brain, as some 
might assume; rather, it is the laboratory-based investigator, who plays the role of the 
observer (Nizami 20 l 4a, 20 l 4b, 2015, 2017). The role of the observer is a key 
concept, and it is discussed at length below. 
The source was nearly as rarely identified as was the destination. The Shannon 
element most frequently named was actually the transmitter. Second-most-frequent 
was the channel, which received so many different interpretations that the reader is 
referred to Table 1. Although the neuron itself seems intuitively to be a channel, the 
neuron itself was, ironically, the thing most likely to be identified as the transmitter. 
Sometimes, a given neuron was deemed both transmitter and channel. A noise source 
was not often identified, even in the early years; identifications of it dwindled to a 
trickle after the mid-l 970's. Even more remarkably, some of the later documents that 
identify noise source name no other Shannon system elements (Table 1 entries 12, 24, 
27, 35, 54, 75). 
Turning now to receiver: this term, too, was not often identified. When named, it 
could be anything from the next neuron brain-wards (for example, Table 1 entries 32, 
46) to some unidentified neuron at the brain (for example, Table 1 entries 39, 58) to 
the human observer himself (for example, Table l entries 4, 19, 38). Note well that the 
latter case conflates receiver with Shannon's own notion of the destination (Shannon, 
1948; Shannon & Weaver, 1949). 
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4. Interim Summary, and Analysis 
Obviously there is a remarkable lack of coherence within neuroscience, both within­
and across-studies, over the identities of the elements of the Shannon general 
communication system. However, in the interests of having an unbiased assessment of 
the total number of distinct interpretations within each column of Table 1, the present 
author recruited a doctoral colleague from a different field, unfamiliar with the 
documents cited in this paper, and encouraged her to choose her own criterion of 
distinctiveness. She chose a relatively conservative one, under which conceptually­
similar interpretations were taken to be identical (such as "we" and "human subjects"; 
or "uncorrelated principal components [of the spike train]" and "spike counts and 
spike timing"; or "neuron" and "afferent fiber" and "chemoreceptor"). The resulting 
number of distinct interpretations of source, transmitter, channel, noise source, and 
receiver were respectively 10, 23, 12, 15, and 11. This altogether allows 455,400 
distinct concatenations of these terms, without even considering the possible 
interpretations of destination. When the latter are included, there are 1,821,600 
potential interpretations of Shannon's general communication system within 
neuroscience. Of course, a different examiner, holding a different standard of 
distinctiveness, might arrive at different numbers of distinct interpretations for each 
column in Table 1. Nonetheless, the total implied number of concatenations of terms 
would be quite large. 
Naturally, not all combinations of Shannon elements will make sense to a 
particular person. Nonetheless, the above calculations should offer a raw sense of the 
enormity of the number of available interpretations when engineering labels are 
assigned willy-nilly to biological phenomena. But we can be even more conservative. 
Suppose that only 0.1 % of the postulated combinations are actually agreeable to all 
judges. We would nonetheless have 455 unique groupings of source, transmitter, 
channel, noise source, and receiver, and 1,822 unique groupings of all six of the 
Shannon elements (i.e., including destination). Such multiplicity represents 
remarkable incoherence amongst neuroscientists. Factors underlying the gamut are 
discussed below. 
Note well that, in the literature, there are numerous attempts to characterize the 
neuroscience experiment as a system, which conflate with attempts to describe the 
neuron itself as a system. This raises an inherent issue, that of scale. The putative 
whole Shannon system has narrowed over time, from being the organism's 
environment, including the organism itself (Table 1, entry 1) to being the orgariism 
itself (Table 1, entries 1, 3, 4, 14, 38) to being entire sensory subsystems within the 
organism (Table 1, entries 7, 16, 17, 29, 39, 44, 45, 47, 74) to being chains of neurons 
(Table 1, entries 13, 58) to being individual neurons (Table I, entries 8, 22, 25, 83; 
also Suksompong & Berger, 2010) and finally to being the synapse between individual 
neurons (see for example Zador, 1998; Manwani & Koch, 2000). The narrower the 
scope of the study, the fewer (as a rule) were the Shannon system elements identified. 
Indeed, it is not unthinkable that someone has characterized physiological pathways 
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inside neurons using information-theory calculations. Apparently, the use of 
information theory in neuroscience is approaching a microscopic vanishing point, 
insofar as the point of using information theory in neuroscience is progressively 
vanishing. 
Ironically, Tononi raises this issue of the proper scale for information theory 
calculations, in an attempt to justify his own integrated information theory: 
An outstanding issue is finding a principled way to determine the proper spatial and temporal scale 
to measure informational relationships and integrated information. What are the elements upon 
which probability distributions of states are to be evaluated? For example, are they minicolumns or 
neurons? And what about molecules, atoms, or subatomic particles? Similarly, what is the "clock" to 
use to identify system states? Does it run in seconds, hundreds of milliseconds, milliseconds, or 
microseconds? (Tononi, 2008, p. 234) 
In these few lines, Tononi inadvertently identifies much of what is wrong with any 
attempt to understand neuronal firing through information theory. This topic will be 
expanded below, within the context of examining three things that influence the gamut 
in Table 1: the ignorance of the role of the observer, the notion of decoding (which is 
inseparable from the notion of the observer), and the pursuit of inappropriate 
metaphors. 
5. Discussion: The Role of the Observer in Calculating "Information" 
5.1 Tononi 's Integrated Information Theory (IJT): What Came First, the 
Consciousness or the Observer? 
In the Introduction, it was noted that the use of information theory is broadening 
throughout biology. Dr. Giulio Tononi and his co-authors were given special mention, 
because they use an information theory framework to produce their IIT of 
consciousness. That theory deserves further scrutiny. That scrutiny reanimates a 
concept that is crucial within second-order cybernetics, namely, the role of the 
observer. 
But let us begin not with Tononi but with Christof Koch, a long-term contributor 
to IIT (Tononi & Koch, 2008, 2015; Koch, Massimini, Boly, &Tononi, 2016; Tononi 
et al., 2016). Indeed, Koch (2012) touts IIT in his book Consciousness: Confessions of 
a Romantic Reductionist. The book was reviewed by the senior philosophy professor 
John Searle (Searle, 2013). Searle notes that "no reason has been given at all why 
there should be any special connection between information theory and 
consciousness" (Searle, non-numbered page). Searle states that 
Consciousness is independent of an observer. I am conscious no matter what anybody thinks. But 
information is typically relative to observers. These sentences, for example, contain information that 
make sense only relative to our capacity to interpret them. So you can't explain consciousness by 
saying it consists of information, because information only exists relative to consciousness. (Searle, 
20 1 3; n.p.) 
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Note that "consciousness is independent of an observer" is an assumption. Also, 
Searle momentarily conflates information that carries meaning (in the commonsense 
notion of information: "Which street leads to Chester?") with the Shannon notion of 
information, as a statistic within the narrowly circumscribed model described by 
Shannon. Nonetheless, in information theory an observer is needed, in order to 
calculate information transmitted (or other related measures), although Shannon does 
not say so (Nizami, 2015). Particularly, the observer is required to know the 
probabilities of particular symbols (see Introduction). 
Regardless, Searle (2013) makes a crucial point: that consciousness precedes and 
is necessary for information, not the converse, no matter what is meant by 
· information. In other words, consciousness is needed to calculate any information 
statistic, such as the ones that, according to Tononi et al., allegedly define 
consciousness. In short, Tononi and Koch and their various co-authors (citations 
above) have reversed the normal cause-and-effect. Remarkably, such a reversal had 
been proposed three decades earlier, in an extraordinarily similar theory, K. H. 
Norwich's entropy theory of perception (e.g., Norwich, 1993). That model is 
permeated by an unanswered, nagging question, namely, "What came first, 
information accrual or perception?" (Nizami, 201 Ob). There is a correct answer, which 
is perception (Nizami 2009a, 2009b, 2010b), where we can momentarily take 
perception to be interchangeable with consciousness, following a tradition that dates 
back to Patrick (1922, p. 704) and perhaps earlier. 
Tononi and his various colleagues commit yet another error. They employ 
information theory to infer content-for example, not only how well a symbol's or 
whole message's destination probability matches its source probability, but what the 
symbol or whole message means. This, too, occurs throughout Norwich and 
colleagues' entropy theory, in which Shannon's information transmitted, described by 
Shannon as reduction of uncertainty (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), is habitually 
interpreted as gain of information, where information is taken to be knowledge and 
knowledge is taken to be something meaningful. But, as Searle (2013, non-numbered 
page) correctly reminds us, "The mathematical theory of ieformation is not about 
content" (italics added). 
Regarding again Tononi 's IIT, Searle says that "Tononi and Koch want to use both 
types of information, they want consciousness to have content, but they want it to be 
measurable using the mathematics of information theory" (Searle, 2013, non­
numbered page; italics added). And Searle is right; consider, for example, Tononi's 
statement that 
The quality of consciousness is determined by the set of all the informational relationships its 
mechanisms generate. That is, how integrated information is generated within a complex determines 
not only the amount of consciousness it has, but also what kind of consciousness. (Tononi, 2008, 
p. 224; italics added) 
In response to Searle (2013), Koch and Tononi were allowed a reply, accompanied by 
a rebuttal by Searle (cited here as Koch, Tononi, & Searle, 2013). Koch and Tononi 
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state that "IIT introduces a novel, non-Shannonian notion of information-integrated 
information-which can be measured as 'differences that make a difference' to a 
system from its intrinsic perspective, not relative to an observer" (Koch et al., 2013, 
n.p.). By "differences that make a difference," Koch and Tononi presumably refer to 
Bateson 's (1972) statement that "In fact, what we mean by information-the 
elementary unit of information-is a difference which makes a difference, and it is 
able to make a difference because the neural pathways along which it travels and is 
continually transformed are themselves provided with energy" (Bateson, p. 459; 
original italics). But here Bateson himself may be conflating the bit of information 
theory with the notion of information as something meaningful. (Readers are invited 
to judge for themselves.) Regardless, the adjoining idea that IIT uses non-Shannonian 
information seems untrue, as a glance at the mathematics of IIT will reveal. Equally 
absurd is the system's alleged "intrinsic perspective, not relative to an observer." Both 
of these points will be discussed below. Searle's rejoinder (Koch, Tononi, & Searle, 
2013) repeats his criticisms and points out that Koch and Tononi had not actually 
answered them. 
Cerullo had already firmly rebutted Tononi: 
There is no current understanding of how to develop a mathematical or computational model of 
meaning (if this is even possible) . . . !IT illustrates the limitations of abstract theories of 
consciousness [that are] generated without taking the architecture of the one system we know 
generates conscious experience, the brain, into account. (Cerullo, 201 1 ,  p. 57) 
In other words, Tononi and co-authors propose to explain consciousness without 
explaining its underlying mechanisms, beyond simply claiming that mechanisms 
generate informational relationships. Tononi and colleagues assume that informational 
relationships cause consciousness rather than merely correlating with it. But even 
emergent phenomena (Nizami, 20 1 7, 2018) require underlying mechanisms; we will 
return to this issue below. Meanwhile, note well that a recent survey (Michel et al., 
2018) suggests that those scientists who accept IIT may be relatively lacking in 
research expertise in precisely the subject that IIT purports to explain, namely, 
consc10usness. 
5.2 The Observer, All-Knowing 
Shannon's general communication system is symmetric; it contains an encoder, the 
transmitter, and a decoder, the receiver. Figure 3 schematizes this symmetry, which 
was present in Fig. 1, and also introduces a feature not shown in Fig. 1, as follows. As 
described in the Introduction, the receiver converts the noisy signal back into a 
message, a message containing some subset of the symbols that were originally 
available to form it at the source. The message is passed to a destination, who is 
presumably a human being. But information transmitted is calculated by yet another 
personage, the observer (Nizami, 2015, 2017). The observer must perforce be all­
knowing, because the observer knows all of the possible inputs to the general 
communication system, as well as their Shannon probabilities (see Introduction). The 
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observer also knows all of the actual inputs and outputs. Remarkably, Shannon 
himself omitted the observer, as noted by a champion of second-order cybernetics, 
Ranulph Glanville. Glanville recognized that the observer is "in the system and is 
taking part" (Glanville, 2007, p. 388). Glanville also noted two implicit assumptions 
about the general communication system: that the meaning of a message "is perfectly 
mapped onto" the message (Glanville, p. 377), and that "the meaning at one end is the 
same as that at the other" (Glanville, p. 377). In short, there is a shared set of 
understandings between the sender (the source) and the recipient (the destination). Not 
only may the sender build meaning(s) into a message that is to be transmitted, but the 
recipient may attempt to derive meaning(s) from whatever is then received. In 
contrast, the observer works with probabilities in order to calculate information 
transmitted, and need not, in principle, understand the messages at all. Shannon's 
information transmitted is a measure of fidelity of data transfer (specifically, how well 
probabilities of presentation are preserved at the receiver), not a measure of "meaning 
transfer." Indeed, messages can even be encrypted, or otherwise composed in an 
unfamiliar language. 
In laboratory experiments, the neuroscientist becomes the observer. The 
neuroscientist remains unchanged (to a convenient first approximation) when 
examining a research organism's response to sensory stimuli and subsequently using 
those responses to calculate information transmitted, according to a method described 
below. However, unlike the neuroscientist, the research organism itself "is changed by 
their interaction with the stimulus. The stimulus is 'a difference that makes a 
difference'" (Nizami, 2011b, p. 1111). Even if the organism is not alert, or is in fact 
asleep, these points remain true. Consider that if neurons in an anesthetized or 
sleeping organism nonetheless fire spikes to a sensory stimulus, then repeating that 
same stimulus can evoke different, and (on average) usually lesser, numbers of spikes 
over time. This phenomenon is well-known and is called firing-rate adaptation; 
Nizami (2010b) discusses some examples. 
5.3 The Observer as Homunculus 
Nizami (2015, 2017) has detailed the role of the observer in observing voltage-spike 
trains and in using them to perform information-theory calculations. The de facto 
observers of neurons are the laboratory staff (Nizami, 2015, 2017). But there is an 
absurd (and popular) interpretation that is implied in the literature, namely, that the 
observer resides within the experimental research subject, whether that subject is 
human or non-human, in the form of a homunculus-in fact, as an infinite regression 
of homunculi (explained in Nizami, 2009a, 2015, 2018). For example, Tononi and his 
colleagues rely on information-related statistics, but their reliance implies the 
existence of a homunculus to calculate those statistics-inevitably, an infinite 
regression of such homunculi. Perhaps not surprisingly, the same infinity of 
homunculi is found within K. H. Norwich's entropy theory of perception (see Nizami, 
2009a, 2009b, 201 Oa, 201 Ob, 2011 b ), within which consciousness (as perception) 
allegedly derives from differences in Shannon information. 
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Recall Searle's (2013) comments about IIT (above). Recall also the declaration by 
Koch and Tononi (in Koch et al., 2013, non-numbered page) that "IIT introduces a 
novel, non-Shannonian notion of information-integrated information-which can be 
measured as 'differences that make a difference' to a system from its intrinsic 
perspective, not relative to an observer." This was to be repeated in Tononi et al. 
(2016, p. 457): "In IIT, information is causal and intrinsic: it is assessed from the 
intrinsic perspective of a system based on how its mechanisms and present state affect 
the probability of its own past and future states (cause-effect power)." Aside from 
asking how one might affect the probability of a past state, let us note well the 
system's alleged "intrinsic perspective" (Koch & Tononi in Koch et al., 2013; Tononi 
et al., 2016). This seems to suggest that neurons are self-observing; more will be said 
on this below. As Tononi et al. (2016, p. 457) continue: "By contrast, Shannon 
information is observational and extrinsic-it is assessed from the extrinsic 
perspective of an observer and it quantifies how accurately input signals can be 
decoded from the output signals transmitted across a noisy channel." Let us critically 
examine these statements. First, the information of IIT is unquestionably some 
interpretation of Shannon information theory. Therefore, Tononi et al. 's first statement 
contradicts their second statement. M0rch (2019), for one, recognizes that the 
information in IIT is indeed extrinsic, in contrast to consciousness itself, whose 
"intrinsic property is a property that does not constitutively depend (though it may 
well causally depend) on properties of other things, or its external surroundings" 
(M0rch, p. 133). The "intrinsic perspective" of Tononi and colleagues (Koch and 
Tononi in Koch et al., 2013; Tononi et al., 2016) requires a homunculus-in fact, an 
infinite regression of homunculi. 
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Figure 3 .  The mirror-image structure of the Shannon general communication system. Calculating 
information transmitted requires the observer. The observer is required to know both the transmitted 
message and the received message, hence the dotted lines that both lead to the observer. 
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6. Discussion: Decoding , in which the Neuron is the Observer 
6.1 The Neuron as the Observer 
Remarkably, the sensory-neuroscience literature not only implies but sometimes 
actually specifies that neurons themselves are observers of other neurons (Nizami, 
2015, 2017). For example, the observer may appear in the literature as the receiver/ 
detector. Reinagel, Godwin, Sherman, and Koch (1999, p. 2559) encapsulate the 
alleged relation of observer to information to receiver as follows: "The 'information' 
in a neural response is defined as the extent to which observing the response would 
reduce a receiver's uncertainty about the particular visual stimulus." But here 
Reinagel et al. conflate the Shannon notion of receiver with that of an observer who 
stands apart from the receiver-containing general communication system. Reinagel et 
al. 's observer/receiver is assigned no firm identity. Reinagel et al. imply that it must be 
a neuron. All of this is typical of the neuroscience literature. Observer-neurons "read" 
spike trains emanating from other neurons, in order to decode those spike trains. 
Decoding then allegedly allows the observer to reconstruct or estimate the actual 
sensory stimulus (Nizami, 2014b, 2017). 
The ubiquitous presumption of neurons as observers dates back at least to the 
attempt by Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, and Pitts (1959) to explain what the frog's 
eye tells the frog's brain, in which consciousness.was effectively granted to individual 
neurons (Nizami, 2017). Going beyond Lettvin et al., we can rhetorically ask how 
else, besides having individually conscious neurons, could an animal's consciousness 
arise? And how could neurons be individually conscious, unless ... unless everything 
that composed a neuron was (hypothetically) conscious! Nizami (2017, 2018) offers 
an alternative to this downward spiral to smaller and smaller conscious constituents, 
namely, emergence. In this phenomenon, "Consciousness emerges from the activity of 
vast numbers of interacting neurons. Likewise, from vast numbers of interacting 
consciousnesses emerge societies, whether animal or human. One part of human 
society is the laboratory group, containing the neuroscientist" (Nizami, 201 7, p. 
1520). Certainly, it is the laboratory group, not the neuron, who perform observations 
and any subsequent decoding (Nizami, 2015, 2017). 
The neuroscience version of the Shannon general communication system is non­
symmetric. Figure 4 illustrates this asymmetry. Note well that the right-hand-side of 
the general communication system (Fig. 1) is now encapsulated within homunculus, 
which may explain the very few, and very different, accounts of receiver and 
destination in the neuroscience literature. 
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Figure 4. The Shannon general communication system in neuroscience experiments. Compare to Fig. 3 .  
The observer is now the homunculus, which cannot know the stimuli applied by the laboratory 
experimenter; it can only know the organism's neuronal responses. Information-transmitted calculations 
are actually done by the laboratory experimenter, who knows both the sensory stimuli and the organism's 
neuronal responses-the transmitted message and the received message (Fig. 3) .  
6.2 The Neuroscientists' Confusion Matrix 
Recall the original Shannon confusion matrix (Fig. 2). It contains the numbers needed 
to calculate information transmitted. And furthermore, it is square; the number of 
rows equals the number of columns. Now consider the neuroscience version. Figure 5 
illustrates the neuroscience confusion matrix. This particular one is square, but only 
for simplicity of comparison to Fig. 2; in the literature, square versions are rare 
(Nizami, 2014b). Note that the neuroscientists' symbols sent (events) are the applied 
sensory stimuli, so that the matrix's columns are labelled by stimuli--or perhaps by 
stimulus ranges, called stimulus categories. This difference arises because a stimulus 
feature such as intensity forms a continuum, at least to our measuring instruments. 
However, the stimulus could be a unitary thing, that is, a Gestalt, such as a face. Even 
so, a face can change along any number of dimensions, perhaps indiscriminably to the 
human eye. Note also the neuroscientists' symbols received (outcomes). These are 
typically the numbers of stimulus-evoked voltage spikes, as counted over some spike­
counting time. But, as noted above, voltage-spike production is stochastic; repeating 
the stimulus may produce a different spike-count. Altogether, then, the confusion 
matrix's rows represent spike-count categories. 
Customarily, a stimulus category k contains just one face or just one intensity. But 
the reasons for this are not explained in the literature. Hence, consider the following 
rationale. If different stimuli within a single stimulus category consistently evoke 
spike-counts that fall within different spike-count categories, then each of the differing 
stimuli can effectively be placed within a separate stimulus category. Conversely, if m 
different stimuli within the particular stimulus category are sufficiently similar that the 
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resulting spike counts fall within just one spike-count category, then those m different 
stimuli are imitating a single stimulus repeated m times. These issues confuse the very 
interpretation of It . In practical attempts at clarification, each stimulus category is 
operationally restricted to a single stimulus, which differs sufficiently from all the 
others employed, such that the difference between stimulus and stimulus category 
effectively disappears. 
6.3 Decoding, Sometimes Called Reconstruction: The Underlying Rationale 
In a typical neuroscience confusion matrix, each matrix entry is the number of times 
that a particular stimulus evokes a spike count that falls within the particular spike­
count category. In terms of the equations in the Introduction, p(k) = N_ k / N is now 
"the probability of giving stimulus k," and p j (k) = N j k / N j. is now "the probability 
that stimulus k was given, for a particular spike count in spike-count category j. " 
However, and in contrast to the calculations explained in the Introduction, obtaining It 
now requires a further step by the experimenter, a step assumed to be carried-out by 
some neuron: namely, to work backwards from each stimulus-evoked spike count so 
as to infer (in practicality, based on a recorded distribution of spike counts) what 
stimulus is implied to have been given. Such inference, called decoding or 
reconstruction, has been attempted numerous times in the literature (for instructional 
examples, see Georgopoulos & Massey, 1988; Furukawa & Middlebrooks, 2002). 
Decoding is a focus of the review paper "Neural Coding: Computational and 
Biophysical Perspectives" (Kreiman, 2004). Kreiman concerns himself with coding 
by neurons and with decoding (within the animal) of the coded messages. In so doing, 
Kreiman reinforces the contemporary state of thinking about neurons, including their 
anthropomorphization (Nizami, 2017). For example, Kreiman (2004) writes of 
"encoding of information in the nervous system" (p. 73), "neuronal communication" 
(p. 73), "bits conveyed by neurons about sensory stimuli" (p. 74), and neurons 
carrying messages. He even speaks of neurons reading, of being interested, of caring, 
of listening, and of talking, as readers can confirm for themselves. Note well that the 
neuron already has many human manifestations in the greater literature (Nizami, 
2017); to that list we must now add psychotherapist. 
Kreiman (2004) rationalizes decoding. In so doing, he perpetuates a cardinal error 
common to the neuroscience literature, namely, the vague and over-frequent use of the 
engineering terms signal and noise. Consider the following: 
Embedded in the idea of a code is the notion that some aspects of neuronal activity can be 
discriminated as a signal while other aspects may be due to noise. The distinction between what 
constitutes a signal and what constitutes noise will be a fundamental one. (Kreiman, 2004, p. 73) 
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Figure 5. The Confusion Matrix of Sensory Neuroscience. 
Fundamental indeed, insofar as being meaningless. That is, neural spike-firing 
variability is typically cast as representing neuronal noise. This renders impossible 
any identification of neuronal signal in terms of that selfsame spike� firing. 
There is more. Note well Kreiman's (2004, p. 74) question, "What would it mean 
to understand the neural code? We would like to be able to predict the neuronal 
activity from a given stimulus and guess which stimulus was presented based on the 
neuronal activity." The reasons for guessing the stimulus appear much later in 
Kreiman 's paper, where Kreiman describes the sensory neuronal responses to a 
moving object which is being seen by the organism, responses that evoke an eventual 
avoidance maneuver, as when the fly takes flight to avoid the looming fly-swatter: 
These codes need to be decoded to ultimately exert any effects on behavior. At the processing stages 
near the motor output, the decoders can be the muscle cells themselves. Muscle cells have to 
interpret the commands by the pre-synaptic neurons and transform those into appropriate behavior. 
For other processing stages more remote from the output, a set of post-synaptic neurons is in charge 
of decoding and recoding. ( Kreiman, 2004, p. 90) 
Note the words behavior, interpret, commands, and in charge, all of which might 
characterize a homunculus. Unquestionably, the homunculus is the metaphor 
underlying decoding (Nizami 2014b, 2015, 2017). 
The literature contains many purpose-built algorithms for decoding (noted in 
Nizami, 2014b, 2015, 20 1 7). All such algorithms are assumption-laden mathematical 
models, that are tantamount to guesswork-hence Kreiman's (2004) use of the word 
guess. To decode with certainty would require knowing the neuronal code for the 
stimulus property (such as intensity) that is manipulated by the experimenter. And 
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here we confront the crux of the matter: The putative neuronal code is unknown, 
perhaps unknowable (Nizami, 2014b, 201 7). Consider that not even an appropriate 
interval for counting spikes can be declared, because there is no firm context for the 
notion of "appropriate" (Nizami, 201 9)! And indeed, rather than averaging voltage­
spike counts over counting times, some researchers have attempted to quantify spike­
firing rates as instantaneous. Here, too, there are problems; there are different ways of 
quantifying instantaneous, with no clarity as to which quantification should be 
employed. All of this is explained by Lansky, Rodriguez, and Sacerdote (2004) and 
their predecessors cited therein, within one particular context, that of the calculable 
but unnatural case of stationary spike firing, in which the underlying stochasticity is 
unchanging over time (i.e., no adaptation). 
In a crushing irony, the very same reason that Shannon's information theory was 
applied to neurons in the first place-namely, the stochastic firing of voltage spikes in 
response to a sensory stimulus-renders impossible a correct calculation of 
information transmitted. Spike-firing variability is cast by neuroscientists as 
Shannon's noise; but Shannon's own noise is really a second signal, its hypothetical 
origin a noise source (Fig. 1 ). It is a signal that acts to corrupt the symbols sent 
(Fig. 1 ). Those symbols have their own inherent randomness, as reflected by their a 
priori probabilities (Introduction). But the latter variability is distinct from the 
stochasticity of voltage-spike firing, which in turn is distinct from Shannon's 
independent additive noise. Furthermore, casting the neural spike-firing variability as 
representing neuronal noise makes it impossible to identify neuronal signal in terms of 
that selfsame spike-firing. Altogether, these distinctions explain the uncoordinated 
plethora of interpretations of noise source in Table I .  
6. 4 The Fallacy of Models as Predictors 
Notwithstanding the impossibility of the neuroscientists' decoding, ft has been used 
in the literature to tout some putative neuronal codes as being superior to others. For 
example, spike count has been compared to first-spike latency, principal components, 
and so forth (briefly reviewed in Nizami, 201 4b). But it is entirely fallacious to 
assume that Shannon information theory can identify which alleged neuronal code is 
the actual one, even assuming that such a code exists. To assume a neuronal code is an 
anthropomorphic assumption. Secondly, codes are assumed to convey meanings. 
However, as noted above, information theory does not gauge meanings. Meaning is 
created by a mind, and is exchanged with other minds. The mind itself presumably 
emerges from mechanoelectrical mechanisms. Altogether, it seems that meaning 
requires mechanisms; this remains true even if messages arising from mechanisms are 
encrypted and hence are seemingly (at first glance) meaningless. However, 
information theory is independent of mechanism (Nizami, 2008), insofar as it neither 
discovers nor dictates mechanisms. That is, although Shannon's information theory 
depends upon the general communication system, it nonetheless neither discovers nor 
dictates the actual mechanisms of transmission or reception or symbol genesis or 
noise genesis. Such processes merely exist independently; that is, information theory 
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ignores context, insofar as information theory cannot specify exactly how a 
transmitter is built (for example), or how data are generated at the source. Truly, 
Shannon information theory cannot discern mechanisms, because it is merely a model, 
and no model whatsoever can discern mechanisms. As such, Shannon information 
theory cannot discern meaning, because meaning requires context, and context is not 
independent of mechanism. Note well that even though meaning requires context, 
context itself (for example, available choices of messages at a source) does not require 
meamng. 
If all this is unclear, consider another approach to the issue: how models are built. 
Once a set of empirical observations are obtained, one or more assumptions are 
postulated, from which a conceptual model is crafted. From the conceptual model, a 
mathematical model might arise. Regardless, with the data having typically been 
followed by one or more assumptions, all the sorts of models that eventually derive 
from those assumptions are themselves tantamount to assumptions. Shannon's general 
communication system is a physical construct which itself represents a set of 
assumptions. But assumptions do not constitute explanations. This distinction is 
profound. Phrased yet another way, models are not predictive. No model predicts the 
existence of gravity, or of matter, or of energy. No model dictates mechanisms; models 
only produce possibilities. By the same token, no mathematical model is independent 
of its grounding, namely, its conceptual framework of assumptions. Nonetheless, 
neuroscientists have taken Shannon's man-made general communication system, a 
framework of assumptions which is the grounding for Shannon's algebra, and have 
supplanted it by neuronal "communication systems" of arbitrary content (Table 1 ). In 
so doing, they have been pushing a gratuitous analogy, the analogy of neurons as 
communication systems. 
7. Discussion: Analogy 
7.1 Warren Weaver and the Communication Metaphor 
The use of information theory grew and persisted outside of engineering. One might 
marvel at this. In fact, Shannon (1956), Wiener (1956), and others (for example, Elias, 
1958; Johnson, 1970) had expressed exasperation early-on about non-engineering 
uses of information theory. Ironically, the ultimate blame can be placed squarely upon 
Warren Weaver's opening chapter in Shannon and Weaver (1949), wherein he used 
analogies freely. Any apparent similarity was taken by Weaver to indicate equality, in 
a trend that was soon to be emulated by many others (documented in Kline, 2015). 
Consider Weaver's interpretation of a Shannon channel and its associated phenomena: 
In the case of telephony, the channel is a wire, the signal a varying electrical current on this wire; the 
transmitter is the set of devices (telephone transmitter, etc .)  which change the sound pressure of the 
voice into the varying electrical current. In telegraphy, the transmitter codes written words into 
sequences of interrupted currents of varying lengths (dots, dashes, spaces). In oral speech, the 
infomrntion source is the brain, the transmitter is the voice mechanism producing the varying sound 
pressure (the signal) which is transmitted through the air (the channel). In radio, the channel is 
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simply space (or the aether, if anyone still prefers that antiquated and misleading word), and the 
signal is the electromagnetic wave which is transmitted. (Shannon & Weaver, 1 949, p. 7) 
In short, the source, the transmitter, the channel, and the symbols sent (signal) are 
whatever Weaver wants them to be, independent of the receiver. Such indulgence was 
soon to be repeated elsewhere (Moles, 1966, as recounted in Nizami, 20l l b). Those 
interpretations set a lax standard for what followed in neuroscience. Note Weaver's 
attitude to a key Shannon concept, symbol: "This is a theory so general that one does 
not need to say what kinds of symbols are being considered-whether written letters 
or words, or musical notes, or spoken words, or symphonic music, or pictures" 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 25). Or (scant years later) sensory stimuli applied to a 
laboratory animal. Weaver continues: "The theory is deep enough so that the 
relationships it reveals indiscriminately apply to all these and to other forms of 
communication" (Shannon & Weaver, p. 25; italics added). Neuroscientists took all 
this to mean that "Information theory provides a natural framework to study 
communication in most systems, and the brain is no exception" (Ince, Petersen, Swan, 
& Panzeri, 2009, p. 13). Communication was to be any form of interaction 
whatsoever; according to neuroscientists, one such interaction is the continuation of 
voltage spikes from one neuron to another by means of inter-neuronal synapses (Table 
1). 
The analogy of the Shannon general communication system as any so-called 
communication system has propagated widely and deeply. Some truly amusing 
examples, both new and old, are available. Consider Mathijssen, Culver, Bhamla, and 
Prakash (2019), who describe a 1-mm-long species of unicellular organism called a 
protist, which can live in water, forming cellular communities. This particular kind of 
protist can rapidly contract its body, creating a pressure wave that provokes others in 
its community to likewise contract, in a chain reaction. Mathijssen et al. (p. 560) refer 
to this chain reaction as communication, with the protist's contraction itself named as 
the transmitter and the responding cells named as the receivers (Mathijssen et al., 
p. 560). Mathijssen et al. (p. 560) also allude to biological signals and noise. Their 
interpretation of information transmission has already entered the mainstream as a 
featured article in Physics Today (Berkowitz, 2019), the magazine of the American 
Institute of Physics, whose 10 member-societies altogether include more than 1 00,000 
people. 
As an older example, consider a paper of Harvard Professor Edward 0. Wilson, 
the two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning author of popular-science books. Wilson (1962) 
evaluated "the amount of information in single odour trails" that are extruded as 
guides by fire ants "as they pertain to the location of the food find" that has been 
discovered by the ant in question (Wilson, p. 148). According to Wilson, the so-called 
information is "presented by the trail and transmitted to the follower workers" 
(Wilson, p. 148), i.e. to the other worker ants who will benefit from the food. Wilson 
actually calculates the signal uncertainty/information J s as the "source entropy" of 
Information Theory in Neuroscience 67 
odor trails and I1 as the "information transmitted between individual workers" 
(Wilson, p. 153). 
7.2 The Map Versus the Territory: The Problem of Ingrained Analogy 
The analogy of neurons (and other biological features) as communication systems has 
been remarkably persistent. Why? Sullivan-Clarke (2019), a sociologist, indirectly 
answers the question through a study of the persistence of metaphors in general. 
Sullivan-Clarke explains, 
Metaphors are a social product of a historically situated community, and often scientists draw from 
everyday language in order to address their epistemic needs. When doing so, scientists run the risk 
of importing implicit assumptions and/or biases of the metaphor into their practice. (Sullivan­
Clarke, 201 9, p. 1 54) 
One such element of everyday language is the word information. Sullivan-Clarke 
explains that the bias continues as scientists "discover" data that suits the metaphor 
and neglect data that does not (the phenomenon of confirmation bias). 
Sullivan-Clarke explains that metaphor-driven research uses analogies: 
Initially, scientists make a comparison between two analogues: the target analogue and the source 
analogue. The target analogue is the phenomenon currently under investigation; it is less familiar. In 
contrast, the source analogue is something that is more famil iar or better understood. For example, 
scientists may appeal to waves in the water as a source analogue in order to hypothesize about sound 
waves (target analogue), or they may use the sexual behavior of guinea pigs as a source analogue to 
learn more about human sexual behavior (target analogue). (Sullivan-Clarke, 20 1 9, p. 1 56) 
Unfortunately, as Sullivan-Clarke notes (p. 160), it is possible that "the metaphor 
becomes commonplace to the point that its use is no longer recognized as 
metaphorical." In other words, the map is mistaken for the territory that it describes. 
But the map is most emphatically not the territory (Korzybski, 1933; after Bell, 1933). 
As a way to avoid ingrained analogies, Sullivan-Clarke offers a suggestion from 
Turbayne (1962). That is, Turbayne "proposes testing the analogies of a community's 
metaphor by contrasting it with those of a competitor" (Sullivan-Clarke, 2019, 
p. 161), because "A competing metaphor provides a different filter for looking at the 
world" (Sullivan-Clarke, p. 161 ). But, as Sullivan-Clarke warns us, in a passage that is 
ironically appropriate for neuroscientists who use information theory, 
Communities that are homogeneous--ones whose members have similar backgrounds and practical 
experiences-will lack the resources to achieve a robust critique capable of destabilizing an 
ingrained analogy because individual members may have little to offer in critiquing the assumptions 
that ground a community-endorsed metaphor. (Sullivan-Clarke, 20 1 9, p. 1 63) 
In other words, neuroscientists are not equipped to criticize those scientists, typically 
physics-trained, who derived information-transmission integrals and who 
subsequently wrote the integral-evaluating software (for a description of some of that 
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software, see Goldberg, Victor, Gardner, & Gardner, 2009; Ince, Mazzoni, Petersen, & 
Panzeri, 2010; Effenberger, 2013; Cessac et al. , 2017). 
7.3 An Ingrained Analogy: Neural Networks as Networks of Actual Neurons 
In a further irony, an inadvertent example of ingrained analogy appears in a recent 
critique of Tononi 's IIT. That is, Doerig, Schurger, Hess, and Herzog (2019) note that, 
according to IIT, no consciousness is evoked by the feedforward sweep of stimulus­
evoked neuronal spikes, but that consciousness does arise when there is consequent 
top-down activation of those same neurons, in the phenomenon of recurrent 
processing. Doerig et al. (2019) pursue these notions within the context of neural­
network models: 
Both recurrent networks and multilayer feedforward networks are universal function approximators. 
That is, they can be used to generate any desired input-output function to any degree of accuracy 
using a finite number of neurons. Therefore, for any recurrent network with a given input-output 
behaviour, there are corresponding feedforward networks with the same characteristics (although 
feedforward networks often need many more neurons than their recurrent counterparts). (Doerig et 
al., 20 1 9, p. 5 1 ) 
For the moment, let us ignore just how recurrent networks might manifest, given that 
all neurons are believed to be one-way spike carriers. Doerig et al. (2019, p. 52) . 
declare that "any behavioural experiment can be seen as an input-output function," 
that is, the experiment can be described by neural-network models. In principle, not 
just one model, but a potentially infinite number of them. Note well that by 
behavioural experiment, Doerig et al. refer to an experiment that requires subjective 
reports from participants. Altogether, Doerig et al. (2019) imply that any behavioral 
experiment can be described by either feedforward networks or recurrent networks. 
But, according to Doerig et al., IIT requires recurrent networks for consciousness, and 
therefore IIT cannot be correct. 
But there is a problem. Although IIT is unquestionably fatally flawed (see section 
5), Doerig et al. (2019) have nonetheless mistaken the map for the territory. A neural­
network model is not an actual network of neurons; the latter would involve far-more­
elaborate connectivity than any present-day model could bear. As Searle (1994, 
pp. 212-225) reminds us, a model of a neurophysiological process is not a 
neurophysiological process, and as such it need not reveal anything about such a 
process (no model can discern mechanisms). Nonetheless, Doerig et al. (2019) 
effectively assume that a mathematical-network model that grossly oversimplifies 
Nature can be conscious, regardless. Their attitude seems to reflect an ingrained 
analogy: If it acts conscious, then it is conscious. Of course, another thing that acts 
conscious (to some onlookers) is one of the psychiatrist Grey Walter's famous 
tortoises, that are primitive robots (Walter, 1950; Holland, 2003). But no psychiatrist, 
including Grey Walter himself, would call them conscious. 
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7.4 A Persistent Metaphor: Nature as Trivial Machine 
There is an ubiquitous and relevant metaphor in the life sciences that Sullivan­
Clarke (2019) mentions but does not pursue, namely, nature as machine. Nicholson 
(2019), however, does indeed pursue this metaphor, and at length. Nicholson asks, "Is 
the cell really a machine?" Nicholson (p. 108), a biologist, notes that "The main 
interpretive framework in molecular biology is mechanicism" (original italics). He 
explains further: 
Modem proponents of mechanicism conceive of the cell as an intricate piece of machinery whose 
organization reflects a pre-existing design, whose structure is wholly intelligible in reductionistic 
terms, and whose operation is governed by deterministic laws, rendering its behaviour predictable 
and controllable-at least in principle. (Nicholson, 201 9, p. 1 08) 
Nicholson calls the dominant molecular-biology paradigm the machine conception of 
the cell (MCC). One such cell, of course, is the neuron. 
Now, second-order cybernetics is concerned with machines of various kinds (von 
Foerster, 1984, 2003). Regarding machines, Nicholson notes that 
Machine analogies and metaphorical references to ' locks' ,  'keys', 'gates', 'pumps' ,  'motors' ,  and 
'engines' continue to pervade the technical literature, as does talk of the 'machinery' and 'circuitry' 
that underlies the cellular organization. The MCC itself is seldom explicitly defended; it has become 
so engrained [sic] in our minds that we simply take it for granted. (Nicholson, 20 1 9, p. I 09) 
This is the problem of ingrained analogy that Sullivan-Clarke (2019) decries. To 
understand the machine analogy, let us first heed Nicolson's own account of machine: 
Although there are many different kinds of machines, a machine can be characterized in very general 
terms as a device with fixed interacting parts that operate in a coordinated fashion to produce a 
predetermined outcome. More specifically, one can identify four distinctive properties of machines 
that are particularly relevant in contemporary formulations of the MCC. First, machines can be 
described in terms of a list of parts and a blueprint indicating how those parts fit together, meaning 
that someone who has never seen a particular kind of machine should in principle be able to 
assemble any number of copies-each virtually identical in appearance and performance-provided 
they can consult the machine's design specifications. Second, as machines are designed to perform 
highly specific functions, their operation is tightly constrained, which is why it is possible to predict 
and control their behaviour. Third, machines are highly efficient in what they do because they 
always follow the exact same sequence of steps in every cycle of their operation. And fourth, the 
operation of machines is not continuous; their functioning can be interrupted and their parts 
examined without thereby jeopardizing their structural integrity. (Nicholson, 2019 ,  p. 1 09) 
This is the familiar trivial machine of Heinz von Foerster (von Foerster, 1984, 2003), 
although Nicholson does not use those terms. But why use machine metaphors in the 
first place? Nicholson (2019, p. 120) explains: "Just as cars manufactured in an 
assembly line according to the same model design will behave almost identically, cells 
endowed with the same genetic program and grown in the same conditions are 
expected to behave almost identically." 
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7. 5 An Alternative Metaphor: Nature as Non-Trivial Machine 
The metaphor of cell as machine contains a sub-metaphor, cell as containing circuits, 
or being parts of circuits. That is, as Nicholson (2019, p. 115)  observes, there is "the 
widespread appeal to wiring diagrams and design charts (akin to those found in 
mechanical and electronic engineering) in schematic representations of metabolic, 
regulatory, and signalling pathways." Signaling pathways-such as the physical 
pathways carrying sensory input to (and within) the brain, or the actual 
transformations that occur along those paths. 
The concept of pathway is a core analogy that underlies the life-sciences 
literature. This is one thing that Nicholson (2019) does not emphasize strongly 
enough. A sequence of biological processes linking a starting scenario to an eventual 
outcome is mapped as an actual physical sequence of steps between two geographic 
places. Biological activity has now become the flowchart or the circuit diagram. The 
territory has become the map. But Nicholson, after performing an extensive review of 
cellular anatomy and physiology, concludes that 
Cells lack all four characteristic properties of machines that were identified in the introduction. First, 
once the crucial role that self-organization plays in shaping the cellular architecture is 
acknowledged, it is difficult to uphold the idea that the spatiotemporal arrangement of the parts of a 
cell obeys a predetermined blueprint or design, as it does in a machine. Second, the conformational 
flexibility of most cellular constituents and the functional promiscuity [i.e. flexibility] they exhibit 
shows that a cell's operation is not as tightly constrained by its structural configuration as it is in a 
machine. Third, whereas a machine performs its function by precisely following a predefined 
sequence of steps, a cell can arrive at a particular end in a variety of ways: it can recruit different 
kinds of molecules to the same function - or the same kind of molecule to different functions -
depending on the conditions it finds itself in. And fourth, a cell cannot be broken down into parts 
without jeopardizing its structural integrity in the way that every machine can. Cellular components 
form deeply intertwined, ever-changing networks of interactions that cannot be individually 
dissected without sacrificing the organization of the whole. (Nicholson, 20 1 9, p. 1 23) 
In other words, the cell's operation is emergent (Nizami, 2017, 2018). Indeed, the cell 
is what Heinz von Foerster calls a non-trivial machine (von Foerster, 1984, 2003). In 
place of cell, we could equivalently say neuron or linked group of neurons. 
7. 6 The Computer Metaphor: Non-Trivial Machines as Trivial Machines (Again) 
Nicholson (2019) has detailed the pursuit of yet another inappropriate metaphor in 
which a trivial machine was used as a model for a non-trivial machine. That is, 
Nicholson (2019) examines 
the idea of the computer, which, by introducing the conceptual distinction between 'software' and 
'hardware',  directed the attention of researchers to the nature and coding of the genetic instructions 
(the software) and to the mechanisms by which these are implemented by the cell's macromolecular 
components (the hardware). (Nicholson, p. 1 09) 
The computer can be classified, for argument's sake, as a trivial machine. The 
computer metaphor also lies at the heart of neuroscience-not per se because software 
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directs hardware, but because of what software directs hardware to do within 
electronic circuits, namely, the steps called computation. Many researchers have 
actually imagined the mind itself to be a computer (reviewed in Nizami, 2018). Kline 
(20 1 5) devotes pp. 44--49 of his history of cybernetics to describing some of the early 
post-1948 turbulence surrounding the arguments over whether computation in the 
nervous system was analog or digital, and indeed whether the metaphor of 
computation was valid at all. 
The trivial-machine metaphor has lasted for decades. Why? As Nicholson 
explains, 
The methods traditionally used to probe the interior of the cell conceal the dynamic nature of its 
architecture because they have to incapacitate it in order to render it visible. Yet to study a cell 
frozen in time is already to approach it artificially as a static, machine-like object, rather than as the 
fluid system that it is in reality. (Nicholson, 20 1 9, p. 1 1 2 )  
Or to approach it as a component of a rigid telecommunications system. Nicholson 
(2019, p. 112) continues, "The structure of a machine, after all, can be grasped in 
abstraction from time (as it is not constantly changing), whereas the structure of, say, a 
whirlpool or a stream cannot." As the whirlpool or the stream, consider the stochastic 
nature of the firing of voltage spikes by neurons in response to steady sensory stimuli. 
This is the neuron as a non-trivial machine. 
8. Final words 
8. 1 The Bandwagon 
Neuroscientists have abused information-theory terms, by simply re-labelling 
Shannon's system. Such relabelling also occurred and failed in psychology, as 
described by Keats (1966) and by Nizami (2009b, 2010a, 201 l a, 201 l b, 2012, 2013), 
and also in linguistics, as explained by Cretu (2008), amongst others. Relabelling has 
never justified the ultra-engineering calculations of information transmitted. Nor, as 
Nizami (20 l 4b) points out, has any attempt at justification besides relabelling ever 
been offered. Shannon information theory is all about the general communication 
system, not about the meaning of whatever message is transmitted using it. 
Regardless, when Shannon information theory is used as Shannon had intended, all of 
its aspects have their own clear meanings, namely, those meanings assumed by 
communications engineers. When not used in this fashion, those meanings disappear. 
Indeed, in the everyday, street notion of the word information, the respective 
communication system is not what matters (in contrast to whatever mechanism 
produces the information's context, such as human behavior). Rather, what matters is 
a message's meaning. 
Non-engineering manipulations of Shannon information theory arrived with 
remarkable haste (Dahling, 1962). This is reflected in the dates of the early entries in 
Table 1. Shannon (1956) was prompted to caution against adopting ultra-engineering 
extensions of information theory. This is highly ironic, given Weaver's introduction to 
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Shannon and Weaver (1949). In view of Shannon's near-immediate fame post-1948 
(as documented in Kline, 2015), it is difficult to believe that Shannon had no say in 
what appeared in the first chapter of a book of which he was the lead author. 
Regardless, Weaver's and others' extensions of information theory beyond 
engineering were stretched yet-further by the popularization of an integral-calculus 
method for calculating information transmitted for neurons, a method explored and 
promoted in numerous papers authored by Rieke, Warland, de Ruyter van Steveninck, 
Bialek, and their various co-authors, culminating in the book Spikes: Exploring the 
Neural Code (Rieke et al., 1997). Such information-transmitted algorithms have 
become available in various software suites (see for example Goldberg et al., 2009; 
Ince et al., 2010; Effenberger, 2013; Cessac et al., 2017). Likewise, software for 
computation of Tononi's IIT is now freely available (Mayner et al., 2018). All of this 
allows neuroscientists having little or no training in math or physics to perform 
computation without comprehension (Nizami, 2016). That is, numbers can be 
produced with little attention to the underlying principles. Consider that neuroscience 
papers, if published after 1991, tend to cite just one source of the information theory 
math, out of more than twenty available textbooks: namely, Cover and Thomas 
( 1 991 ). Remarkably, Cover and Thomas never mention any use for information theory 
in the life sciences; likewise, it is exceedingly rare (with the exception of Nirenberg et 
al., 2001) that neuroscientists citing Cover and Thomas (1991) mention any specific 
page number, equation, passage, or concept, as if they had never read the book 
(Nizami, 2016). The present readers might likewise wonder whether the various 
authors citing Spikes had understood that tome, either (Nizami, 2016). The authors of 
Spikes were primarily physicists by training, not neuroscientists or biologists. But 
neuroscience, like law or medicine, is not something practised as a hobby. 
8.2 Information as Failed Metaphor, and Its Consequences 
The neuroscience establishment has a longstanding explanation for their use of 
Shannon information theory: "By analogy! " (Dahling, 1962). As Kline (2015, p. 152) 
explained it, "The central analogy of cybernetics [is the notion] that both humans and 
machines could be studied using the same principles from control and 
communications engineering." However, analogy is hope, not proof. In the case of 
information, the analogy altogether fails. The situation is synopsized in an insight 
from Wong (2007) regarding one particular information theory model of sensory 
neuronal firing, namely, the entropy theory of perception (Norwich, 1993). Wong 
(2007, p. 2) states that "little justification (beyond the simple analogy of the senses as 
a communications system) was provided for why information underlies the process of 
perception and why this result is universal." An earlier, broader view came from · 
Rosen: 
It is well known that "information" is one of the murkiest and most overworked words in the 
scientific lexicon (perhaps only the word "model" can be compared to it). Indeed, there is almost no 
relation between the "information" of the Information Theory of Shannon (which beguiles many 
through its superficial relation to [thermodynamic] entropy), the "genetic information" upon which 
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development, physiology and evolution devolve in their several ways, and the "information" 
appearing diversely in the functioning of the brain. (Rosen, 1 985,  p. 34) 
Rosen's conclusions are just as fresh today. 
Finally, we might ask what impact these informational misadventures have had on 
society at large. In this regard, Sullivan-Clarke (2019, p. 160) notes that "The issue of 
how to prevent scientists and their communities from being misled by metaphor and 
analogy has not only an epistemic component, but it takes on a moral one as well." 
The question of morality is well-exemplified in a paper that was not mentioned by 
Sullivan-Clarke, namely, Mudrik and Maoz (20 1 4). Mudrik and Maoz explain another 
pervasive and misleading neuroscience metaphor, that of the brain and the self as 
having different mental states. The metaphor, in which the brain is anthropomorphized 
(Nizami, 2017), becomes a convenient excuse for deadly criminal acts ("my brain 
made me do it"). Of course, less-dangerous outcomes have arisen from metaphors, but 
such outcomes are disturbing, nonetheless. Consider the misuse of information in 
neuroscience, namely, the pursuit of the weak metaphors that any sensory stimulus is a 
symbol and that any interaction with symbols is communication. Consider particularly 
the long-term cost in money, time, and unfounded personal advancement. Here are 
some plausible numbers from the present author 's experience. The number of peer­
reviewed papers expounding information theory analyses of neuronal firing probably 
well-exceeds 1 ,000. A typical contemporary cost for such a study might be $30,000 
United States dollars, most of it committed to salary. Altogether, that's $30,000,000 in 
total costs, as a minimum cost estimate-enough, at current salaries, to support 600 
postdoctoral research fellows for an entire year. Then, there is the wasted time: 
hundreds of thousands of hours, spent primarily by the graduate students and 
postdoctoral research fellows who are responsible for running the relevant 
experiments, programming the calculations, and preparing the manuscripts and the 
associated conference presentations. And now we reach the most important factor: the 
number of people receiving academic promotions, some to tenured professorships, 
based on papers that present misleading information-theory analyses, all in a time of 
grotesque job shortages. 
Note well that wasted money, wasted time, and undue promotion also characterize 
outright research fraud (Chevassus-au-Louis, 2019). Indeed, the cost of inappropriate 
metaphors can be extreme, insofar as metaphor-driven research may be used for social 
purposes that advantage some citizens while disadvantaging others; readers are left to 
peruse the examples that Sullivan-Clarke (2019) provides. 
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organism" (both p. 222) 
Body of photoreceptor 
cell (p. 403) 
"The skin" (p. 395) 
"Nerve cell or group of "Nerve cell" (p. 799), 
nerve cells" (p. 797), "Neuron" (p. 800) 
"Neuron" (p. 800) 
"Single trigemino-
thalamic neurons" 
(p. 79 1 )  
Oo 
Noise Source Receiver _ i-._, 
"The human visual 
sense" (p. 22 1 )  
"Dark noise [the cell 's  Synapse of 
internal noise]" (p. 405) photoreceptor cell with 
afferent neuron (p. 403) 
r... Cl 
"Random fluctuations ::! (") 
in the part of the (I> 
neuronal cycle at which � the stimulus begins . . .  Cl 
[and] the duration of �. 
successive interspike 
intervals . . .  [and] the 
'state' of the neuron" 
(p. 800; original 
internal quotation 
marks) 
Reference Source Transmitter Channel 
1 2 .  Durlach & Braida, 
1 969 
1 3 .  Walkie, 1 970 "Nerve cells" (p. 745), "Chains of nerve cells" 
"The muscle" (p. 757), (p. 745), "The DSCT 
"Each primary afferent [dorsal spinocerebellar 
fiber" (p. 762) tract] neurons" (p. 746) 
14 .  Walter & Gardiner, "Some sensory input" 
1 970 (p. 353), "The input 
S.V. [stochastic 
variable]" (p. 354), 
"Task" (p. 369) 
1 5 . Harris & Stark, "A I -cm photoreceptive 
1 97 1  nerve fiber" (p. 67) 
1 6 . Kenton & Kruger, "An afferent channel" "Nerve fibers" (p. 1 1 6), 
1 97 1  (p. 1 1 4) "The fiber" (p. 1 25) 
Noise Source 
"Sensation noise and 
memory noise. The 
sensation noise includes 
all the random elements 
in the transformation 
from the stimuli to the 
decision variable, 
except for those related 
to memory" (p. 374; 
original italics) 
"Irrelevant waves" 
(p. 357) 
"Ionic or anatomical 
noise in the nerve-
membrane resistance or 
geometry" (p. 67) 
Receiver 
"The decoder" (pp. 747, 
752), "One DSCT 
neuron" (p. 757), "A 
number of DSCT cells" 
(p. 762) 
"A particular behavioral 
output" (p. 353), "The 
output S.V. [stochastic 
variable]" (p. 354), "Its 
correlates in the evoked 
response" (p. 369) 
� � 
� � 
5· 
::s 
� 
(I) 
0 
� 
;:;· 
� 
l::: 
cs "' (") 
(ii• 
::s 
(") (I) 
Oo ...., 
Reference 
1 7 . Eckhorn & Pope!, 
1 974 
1 8 . Eckhom & Pope!, 
1 975 
Source 
"The stimulus at the 
input (eye) and the 
impulse train at the 
output, i.e. on the axon 
of the nerve cell" 
(p. 1 94) 
Transmitter 
"The signals" (pp. 1 9 1 ,  
1 92), "Each single 
symbol" (p. 1 96), "Each 
actual pair of symbol 
sequences" (p. 1 96), 
"Consecutively emitted 
and received symbols" 
(p. 1 96) 
"Ganglion cells and 
geniculate P-cells" 
(p. 7; also p. 1 5), "The 
investigated neuronal 
channel" (p. 8), "The 
on-center neuron . . .  
[or] the off-center 
neuron" (p. 1 1 ), "One 
impulse" (p. 1 1 ), "One 
stimulus" (p. 1 1  ), "The 
center stimulus" (p. 1 2), 
"Large area 
stimulation" (p. 1 2), 
"The discharge pause, 
and the following 
spontaneous discharge" 
(p. 1 3), "A presynaptic 
ganglion cell" (p. 1 3), 
"The system" (p. 1 4) 
Channel 
"The visual system 
from the cornea to the 
recording site" (p. 1 94 ), 
"The eye including 
ganglion cells or the eye 
including the ganglion 
cell level and the LON 
[lateral geniculate 
nucleus]" (p. 1 97) 
"The cornea to the 
recording site of the 
microelectrode, the 
dorsal lateral geniculate 
nucleus" (p. 7), "The 
axons" (p. 7), "A 
ganglion cel l ' s  axon" 
(p. 8) 
Noise Source Receiver 
Oo � 
t-­s::i ::s 
(') (1) 
� s::i 
�. 
Reference 
19 .  Lass & Abeles, 
1 975 
20.  Majernik & 
Kaluzny, 1 975 
2 1 .  Hannam & 
Farnsworth, 1 977 
Source 
"The set of external 
stimuli 
S = [s 1 , s2, . . .  , snl 
(acoustical signals) 
with its probability 
distribution 
P = [pl >  P2, . .  · , Pnl" 
(p. 1 75) 
Transmitter 
"The periodontal 
innervation [the first 
order periodontal 
neurons]" (p. 1 8 1 )  
Channel 
"The [neuron's] axon" 
(p. 6 1 )  
N oise Source 
"Three sources of noise 
may be considered. 
F irst, the latent period 
between application of 
the stimulus and 
initiation of the action 
potential may be 
subjected to random 
variations . . .  
[Secondly] random 
variations in the 
velocity of propagation 
of the action potential 
along the axon 
. . .  [Thirdly] the 
instrumentation used . . .  
[namely] internal noise 
of the peak detector" 
(p. 67) 
Receiver 
"The observer" (p. 6 1 ;  
original italics) 
"The sensory space Z in 
which to each 
point a perception is 
coordinated" (p. 1 75) 
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Reference 
22. Smith, Bowdan, & 
Detbier, 1 983 
23.  Fuller & Looft, 
1 984 
24. Eckhom & 
Querfurth; 1 985 
25. Optican & 
Richmond, 1 987 
26. Georgopoulos & 
Massey, 1 988 
Source Transmitter 
"A chemoreceptor" 
(pp. 8 1 ,  82, 96), 
"[Neuronal voltage] 
Impulses" (p. 83), "The 
[insect's prothoracic] 
leg" (p. 94) 
"A neuron" (p. 379) 
"The spike count" 
(p. 1 62), "The neuron" 
(p. 1 63), "Different 
(uncorrelated) principal 
components [of the 
spike train]" (p. 1 63), 
"The response about a 
stimulus [sic] . . .  the 
spike count code" 
(p. 1 68) 
"The neuronal 
populations" (p. 3 1 7), 
"Movement direction" 
(of a target stimulus; 
p. 3 1 8) 
Channel 
"The neuron" (pp. 1 63,  
1 64) 
Noise Source 
"Fluctuation 
phenomena at the 
transducing and 
encoding sites" (p. 1 66) 
Receiver 
Oo °' 
t-.. l:l 
;::; C'.> (1) 
'.<; t::;· 
�-
Reference Source Transmitter 
27. Bialek, Rieke, de 
Ruyter van Steveninck, 
& Warland, 1 99 1  
28. Geisler, Albrecht, Sensory neuron (p. 335) 
Salvi, & Saunders, 1 99 1  
29. Theunissen & "A 'transmitter"' "The air-current 
Miller, 1 99 1  (p. 1 69 1 ), "The air- stimulus generator" 
current stimulus (p. 1 692) 
generator" (p. 1 692) 
30. Skaggs, 
McNaughton, Gothard, 
& Markus, 1 992 
3 1 .  Golomb, Kleinfeld, 
Reid, Shapley, & 
Shraiman, 1 994 
32. Heller, Hertz, Kjaer, "A neuron" (pp. 1 75,  
& Richmond, 1 995 1 76, 1 88) 
33. Rieke, Bodnar, & "Primary sensory 
Bialek, 1 995 afferent spike trains" 
(p. 259), "Sensory 
neurons" (p. 263) 
34. Roddey & Jacobs, "The intemeurons" 
1 996 (p. 1 376) 
Channel Noise Source 
"Timing errors, 
dropped spikes, and 
spontaneously 
generated spikes" 
(p. 1 856) 
"An ensemble of four 
neurons" (p. 1 690) 
"A neuron" (p. 1 036) 
"The different temporal 
modes, or principle 
components [of the 
spike train]" (p. 2998) 
"The neuron" (p. 1 75) 
Receiver 
A layer of neurons 
(p. 1 692) 
"Other neurons" 
(p. 1 75) 
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Reference Source Transmitter Channel Noise Source Receiver Clo 
35 .  Waters, 1 996 "The .spontaneous 
generation of action 
potentials within its [a 
moth's] own auditory 
system" (p. 864) 
36. De Ruyter van The neuron (p. 1 807) 
Steveninck, Lewen, 
Strong, Koberle, & 
· Bialek, 1 997 
37 .  Juusola & French, "Sensory systems" 
1 997 (p. 959) 
38. Rieke, Warland, de "The outside world" "Sensory neurons" "The device we are "We" (p. 1 04) � 
Ruyter van Steveninck, (p. 1 04) (p. I 0 I ), "The spike trying to characterize" Cl ::s 
& Bialek, 1 997 train" (p. I 01  ), "The (p. 1 02) (") (I) · 
system" (p. 1 48), � "Vesicles at a chemical 
synapse" (p. 1 87), Cl ;:s 
"[number of] Spikes" - ·  
(p. 1 87) 
39. Warland, Reinagel, "Retinal ganglion cells" "The output of the cone "The brain" (p. 2336) 
& Meister, 1 997 (p. 2336), "Spike train" photoreceptor" 
(pp. 2343, 2346), "The (p. 2348) 
summed signal [of a 
cone photoreceptor]" 
(p. 2348) 
40. Strong, Koberle, de Spike train (pp. 1 97, 
Ruyter van Steveninck, 1 99) 
& Bialek, 1 998 
4 1 .  Wiener & "A channel" (p. 2 8 1 )  "The neuronal 
Richmond, 1 998 responses" (p .  28 1 )  
Reference Source Transmitter Channel 
42. Zador, 1 998 "A retina" (p. 1 228)  
43. Reinagel, Godwin, "'An LGN [Lateral 
Sherman, & Koch, 1 999 Geniculate Nucleus] 
response [spike train]" 
(p. 256 1 ), 
"Thalamocortical 
synapses" (p. 2568) 
44. Baddeley, 2000 "The time-varying "A representation" 
membrane potential" (p. 1 4), "An insect eye" 
(p. 5) (p. 1 4) 
45. Burton, 2000 "The early visual "The optic nerve" 
system" (p. 26), "A (p. 25), "Ganglion 
single neuron" (p. 26), cells" (p. 38) 
"The channel" (p. 26), 
"The ganglion cell" 
(p. 33)  
Noise Source 
"The probability 
[symbol omitted] that a 
glutamate-filled vesicle 
is released after 
presynaptic activation 
may be less than unity 
. . .  [and also] the post-
synaptic current in 
response to a vesicle 
may vary even at single 
individual terminals" 
(p. 1220) 
"The random nature of 
photon arrival or the 
unreliability of 
synapses" (p. 1 6) 
"The standard deviation 
in photon count" 
(p. 26), "Synaptic 
transmission" (p. 27) 
Receiver 
� � .... 
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s::i 
5· 
;::; 
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(ii• 
;::; ("") 
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Oo 'O 
Reference 
46. Eguia, Rabinovich, 
& Abarbanel, 2000 
47. Laughlin, 
Anderson, O'Can-oll, & 
de Ruyter van 
Steveninck, 2000 
48. Baird, Taube, & 
Peterson, 200 I 
49. Rogers, Runyan, 
Vaidyanathan, & 
Schwaber, 200 1 
Source 
The environment 
(p. 1 03 1 )  
Transmitter 
"Environment" 
(p. 7 1 1 1 ) 
"A blowfly 
photoreceptor or a 
retinal intemeuron" 
(p. 4 1 ), "A neuron" 
(p. 42), "The graded 
responses of a single 
blowfly photoreceptor" 
(p. 46), "Second-order 
neurons called LMCs 
[large monopolar 
cells]" (p. 50), "Graded 
responses of LMCs" 
(p. 50), "Biological 
systems" (p. 54), "A 
single protein" (p. 54), 
"Action potentials" 
(p. 54) 
"[Neural] cells acting 
alone and together" 
(p. 1 028) 
"The spike train" 
(pp. 450, 457) 
Channel 
"Neural 
communications 
channels" (p. 7 1 1 1 ), 
"One neuron" (p. 7 1 1 2), 
"A neuron that receives 
the spike train, a 
synaptic connection, 
and a receiver that is 
another neuron" 
(p. 7 1 1 3), Synapse 
(p. 7 1 14) 
"A small, low­
information-capacity 
synapse" (p. 52), Axon 
of LMC (p. 53) 
Noise Source · Receiver 
"Decision centers" 
(p. 7 1 1 1  ), "The receiver 
neuron" (p. 7 1 1 2), Any 
neuron (p. 7 1 1 4) 
'O 0 
t-.. � ;:s 
� 
� 
�. 
Reference 
50. van Rullen & 
Thorpe, 200 1 
5 1 .  Wiener, Oram, Liu, 
& Richmond, 200 1 
52. Furukawa & 
Middlebrooks, 2002 
53. Averbeck, Crowe, 
Cha fee, & 
Georgopoulos, 2003 
54. Chacron, Longtin, 
& Maler, 2003 
55.  Hsu, Woolley, 
Fremouw, & 
Theunissen, 2004 
Source Transmitter 
"Neurons" (p. 1 255) 
"The neuron" (p. 8 2 1 2) 
"Three unidimensional 
parameters: mean spike 
count, mean spike 
latency, and the 
dispersion of spike 
latency" (p. 1 750), 
"Each unit [i.e., 
relevant neuron]" 
(p. 1 753) 
"Single neurons and 
ensembles" (p. 1 43), 
"Single neurons and 
small neuronal 
ensembles" (p. 1 45), "A 
system with a given 
amount of noise" 
(p. 1 50) 
"The responses of 
single neurons" 
(p. 9202), The entropy 
of "the distribution of 
the magnitude of the 
time-varying mean 
firing rate" (p. 9206) 
Channel 
"The optic nerve" 
(p. 1 26 1 )  
Noise Source 
"Channel and synaptic 
noise" (p. 82 1 )  
"Variability over trials 
of the neural response" 
(p. 9204) 
Receiver 
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Reference Source Transmitter Channel N oise Source Receiver N 
56. Lu & \Vang, 2004 "Neurons" (p. 309) 
57. Osborne, Bialek, & "A cell" (p. 3 2 1 2) 
Lisberger, 2004 
58 .  Passaglia & Troy, "Retinal ganglion cells" "A spiking neuron "Target neurons in the 
2004 (p. 1 2 1 9) anywhere in the brain" (p. 1 2 1 7) 
nervous system" 
(p. 1 228) 
59. Nelken, Chechik, "Neurons in auditory 
Mrsic-Flogel, King, & cortex" (p. 1 99), "Spike 
Schnupp, 2005 count" (p. 2 1 6) 
60. Arabzadeh, Panzeri, "Neurons" (pp. 92 1 6, r-. Cl 
& Diamond, 2006 92 1 7) ;:s � � 
6 1 .  Koch, McLean, "Brisk-transient "Individual ganglion � Segev, Freed, Berry II, ganglion cells" cells" (p. 1 43 1 )  �. Balasubramanian, et al. (p. 1 43 1 ) 
2006 
62. V ictor, 2006 Neurons (p. 303) Neurons (p. 304) 
63. Sadeghi, Chacron, Afferents (pp. 77 1 ,  774, 
Taylor, & Cullen, 2007 777) 
Reference Source 
64. Eyherabide, Rokem, 
Herz, & Samengo, 2008 
65. Johnson, 2008 "Stimulus/motion 
66. Ikeda & Manton, 
2009 
67. Saal, Vijayakumar, 
& Johansson, 2009 
generator" (p. 1 04) 
Transmitter Channel 
"Each event" (p. 5), 
"Each single n-burst" 
(pp. 5, 1 6) where the 
latter is "The set of 
consecutive spikes 
whose ISis [inter-spike 
intervals] fell within the 
domain of the first peak 
of the coITelation 
function" (p. 4), "Burst 
firing" (pp. 1 1 , 1 3 ), "A 
code based on the intra­
burst spike count n" 
(p. 1 5) 
"Encoder" (p. 1 04) "A neuron or a 
population of neurons" 
(p. 1 04); "a jointly 
defined multi­
dimensional point 
process" (p. I 04) 
"Spike counts and spike 
timing" (p. 8022), 
"Afferents" (p. 8026), 
"The timing of only the 
first spikes elicited in 
tactile afferents" 
(p. 8028), "Firing rates" 
(p. 8028), "Precise 
spike timing and firing 
rates" (p. 8029) 
"A single neuron" 
(p. 1 7 1 4) 
"Individual afferents" 
(p. 8023) 
Noise Source 
"Stimulus/motion 
decoder" (p. 1 04) 
Receiver 
� � 
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Reference Source Transmitter Channel Noise Source Receiver -i::. 
68.  McDonnell, Burkitt, "The place of "The interface between 
Grayden, Meffin, & stimulation" on an an electrode array and 
Grant, 20 1 0  electrode array the auditory nerve" 
implanted in the inner (p. 928), "Each 
ear (p. 932) individual fiber" in the 
auditory nerve (p. 930), 
" ! ) A mechanism for 
conversion of place of 
stimulation into 
electrical activity in the 
auditory nerve; 2) 
processing of auditory 
nerve activity that is 
carried out by higher 
levels of the brain, 
including the auditory r.... t:l brainstem and auditory ::s ("") cortex" (p. 932) (I> 
69. Lawhem, Nikonov, "The periphery [the � t:l 
Wu, & Contreras, 201 1 peripheral sensory �. 
organs - eyes, nose, 
etc.]" (p. I )  
70. McDonnell, Ikeda, "Spoken voice "The brain" (p. 3), "A neuron" (p. 9) Randomness of the "Cortical neurons" 
& Manton, 201 1 or PDF (portable "Cortical neurons" inter-spike time interval (p. 1 0), neurons (p. 1 4) 
document format) (p. I 0), "spikes" (p. 1 5) (p. I I ), "internal noise 
documents" (p. 4). "The in the transduction 
'input'" (p. 1 0) mechanisms" (p. 1 2) 
Reference Source Transmitter Channel Noise Source Receiver 
7 1 .  Aldworth, Bender, "Neuron" (p. 6) "The axon [of the "Temporal uncertainty 
& Miller, 20 1 2  neuron J itself' (p. I ), arising from AP [action 
"Short !Sis [inter-spike- potential] conduction 
intervals]" (p. 8), (transmission jitter), AP 
"Nervous systems" acceleration due to a 
(p. 8) supernormal period, AP 
deceleration due to 
refractory effects, and 
AP conduction failures" 
(p. 1 ;  see also p. 2) 
� 
72. So, Ganguly, "A redundant encoding � .... 
Jimenez, Gastpar, & scheme at the [neural] � 
� Cannena, 20 1 2  ensemble level" 5· (p. 556) ;::s 
� 
73. Effenberger, 20 1 3 "Neurons" (p. 1 38), "A "Neurons" (p. 1 78), (1) c 
communication "Synapses" (p. l 78), � 
channel" (p. 1 57), "The "The early sensory Si' source" (p. 1 67) pathway" (p. 1 82) � 
s:: 
cs "" (") 
74. Faghihi, "The antenna] Jobe [of "The antenna and (;; ' ;::s Kolodziejski, Fiala, Drosophila fruit flies]" antenna] lobe" (p. 2), (") (1) Worgotter, & Tetzlaff, (p. 1 ), "The Drosophila "The Drosophila 
20 1 3  olfactory system" melongaster [sic] 
(pp. 2, 3) olfactory system" (p. 3)  
75. Farfan, Albarracin, "The recording 
& Felice, 20 1 3  hardware, the recording 
environment and the 
spatially averaged 
activity of distant 
axons" (p. 95) 
"° ...,, 
\0 
Reference Source Transmitter Channel Noise Source Receiver °' 
76. Garcia-Lazaro, "The cells" (p. 1 9366) 
Belliveau, & Lesica, 
20 1 3  
77. Aldwotth & Projection neurons 
Stop fer, 20 1 5  (pp. 1 52 1 ,  1 527), "The 
system" (p. 1 52 1 )  
78. Jadzinsky & "Ganglion cells" (p. 1 ), 
Baccus, 20 1 5  "The neural code" (p. 2) 
79. Kostal & The neuron (p. 3 )  "The neuron" (p. 3) 
Kobayashi, 20 1 5  t--. � ;:s 
("'.) (\) 
80. Wibral, Lizier, & "Specific neural � Priesemann, 20 1 5  responses" (p. 5) � 
�. 
8 1 .  Rathkopf, 20 1 7  "An environmental "A single perceptual "A motor neuron . . .  
property" (p. 322) neuron" (p. 322); which controls 
"strings . . .  for example, locomotion" (p. 322) 
a long binary string [of 
ones and zeros)" 
(p. 33 1 )  
82. Wang, Borst, "The H I  neuron" 
Zaslavsky, Tishby, & (p. 1 3), "The 
Segev, 20 1 7  photoreceptors" (p. 1 6) 
Reference 
83. Liu, Yue, Yu, Liu, 
& Yu, 20 1 8  
84. Voronenko & 
Lindner, 20 I 8 
Source Transmitter 
"The neurons" (pp. 220, 
223-225), "APs [action 
potentials)" (p. 229) 
"Neurons" (p .  I )  
Channel Noise Source 
"The inner noise source 
is mainly from the 
stochastic gating of the 
ion channels" (p. 2 1 9) 
Receiver 
Mitcham, J. ( 20 1 7). The Future ls but the Obsolete in Reverse, Still 14 (detail). Painting and drawing stop-motion animation combined with live action video. 
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